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ABSTRACT
Rorty should be read as a reformer, rather than a revolutionary transformer. While 
the reformer aims to improve what is already good, the revolutionary transformer 
seeks to dispense with the merely good in a quest for the absolutely best. For Rorty 
this choice was a bad choice. In order to make the case that Rorty was a reformer, 
we explicate Rorty’s views on truth. These views argue that we can obtain con-
sensus about what is worth preserving and improving without reference to either 
rightness, truth, or objectivity. For after all, there is no way for philosophers to get 
outside the circle of language within which we debate about what we take to be 
authoritative and aceptable.
Keywords: Hilary Putnam, Charles Peirce, William James, truth, 
objectivity, post-philosophy, reformer.
RESUMEN
Rorty debe ser leído como un reformador, y no como un transformador revo-
lucionario. Mientras que el reformador trata de mejorar lo que ya es bueno, el 
transformador revolucionario trata de dejar de lado lo que es bueno en búsqueda 
de lo que es absolutamente lo mejor. Para Rorty esta es una mala selección. Para 
defender el argumento de que Rorty es un reformador, explicaremos lo que Rorty 
pensó acerca de la verdad. El pensó que podemos obtener un consenso acerca de lo 
que vale preservar y mejor sin hacer referencia a la rectitud, verdad, o objetividad. 
Después de todo, no hay forma en que los filósofos puedan salir fuera del circulo 
del lenguaje en el cual debatimos acerca de lo que tomamos por autoritativo y 
aceptable.
Palabras clave: Hilary Putnam, Charles Peirce, William James, verdad, 
objectividad, postfilosofía, reformador.
Swift has sailed into his rest; 
Savage indignation there 
Cannot lacerate his breast. 
Imitate him if you dare, 
World-besotted traveller; he 
Served human liberty.
W. B. Yeats’s translation of Jonathan Swift’s self-composed Latin epitaph
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A curious phenomenon haunts the world of academic philoso-
phy, as a wave of revisionisms introduces readers to “new” historical 
figures. There is a new Nietzsche, who challenges the language 
and thought of onto-theology and is not just another late Romantic; 
there is a new Husserl, who is not merely a semantic theorist of 
intentionality and the lifeworld but also develops a doctrine of non-
fictional, Nietzsche-proof, transcendental subjectivity; there is a new 
Wittgenstein, whose journey from early to later thinking is not merely 
one from metaphysical realism to metaphysical anti-realism but a 
complex transit from one way of ruling out metaphysical nonsense to 
another; and now, perhaps inevitably, there are the new pragmatists, 
who see truth as an objective matter of “getting things right” rather 
than a mere relative matter of whatever we happen to let each other 
say, in our culture, this week.1 
This latest case of revisionism is, above all, an attack on the ideas of 
the late Richard Rorty, who took his own views to update those of the 
historical pragmatists William James, John Dewey, and C. S. Peirce. 
The new pragmatic revisionists challenge both Rorty’s non-objectivist 
story of truth and his attribution for that story to the historical fig-
ures of pragmatism, especially Peirce and Dewey. Rorty’s view of truth 
and thinking seemed to leave humanity adrift in a sea of arbitrariness, 
with no real grounds for criticism of what anyone might actually do 
or say.2 The pragmatic revisionists try to locate more objective under-
standings of truth in the work of the historical pragmatists, and they 
make their own new arguments in favor of attention to “how things 
are, anyway” and “getting things right” (cf. Misak 19ff).
In what follows, I shall try to explain Rorty’s position on truth 
–an especially difficult thing to do, having so clearly concluded from 
Rorty’s own writing that objections to it are the things that are hard 
to understand. I’ll argue that Rorty was right to look back to James, 
Dewey and Peirce as forebears and that his ideas are not really the 
menace to civilization that the revisionists think they are. Even if we 
take Rorty’s advice and stop trying to dig up any kind of philosophi-
cally useful objectivity, there will be just as much room as there always 
was for the project of criticizing wrong acts and beliefs and then get-
ting things right. Criticism and improvement of our theories and our 
ways of life do not have to involve insistence on objective rightness or 
truth, and we can, without invoking objectivity, do all the reforming 
worth doing and get all the rightness worth having.
1 Examples of work in these movements are found at Allison (2000), Welton (2003), 
Crary and Read (2000), and Misak (2007).
2 “The trail of the human serpent is over everything, as James said, but this does not 
toss us into the sea of post-modern arbitrariness, where truth varies from person to 
person and culture to culture” (Misak 2).
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I
Hilary Putnam does not seem to be an official member of the 
new pragmatist movement, for whatever reason, but he anticipated 
their main complaints. He railed against Rorty’s social theory of 
truth as he mounted somewhat critical defenses of both the old 
pragmatists and more recent pragmatic thinkers like W. V. Quine. 
In Putnam’s view, Rorty was doing for the logical ideal of truth 
what the crudest logical positivists had done for moral, political, 
and aesthetic ideals; he was explaining them with “non-cognitivist” 
or “emotivist” theories (cf. Putnam 1990 24). For the positivists, at 
least in their stereotypical representation, the pronouncements “Karl 
Shapiro’s Buick is one of the best modernist poems in English”, “[t]his 
society has been much improved by the emancipation of women” 
and “[g]ross economic inequality is a moral iniquity” are equiva-
lent, respectively, to “Poem, mmm!”, “[f]ree women, yay!” and “[i]
nequality, ewww!” There was nothing really to be right or wrong 
about in making those animal noises, which could not be rationally 
criticized, only liked, tolerated, loathed, repeated, ignored, or sup-
pressed by the people who heard them. Analogously, Rorty seemed 
to think that “[t]he theory of evolution is true”, roughly meaning 
“[e]volution-talk, whoopee!”. We the majority either let people get 
away with such expressions of approval or we don’t, and there is no 
genuinely normative issue involved here, no way to judge such an 
expression to be genuinely better or worse than “[e]volution-talk, 
yuck!”. 
Rorty was fond of saying things that fit this interpretation. For 
example, he observed that “those who wish to reduce objectivity to 
solidarity –call them ‘pragmatists’– do not require either a meta-
physics or an epistemology. They view truth as, in William James’ 
phrase, what is good for us to believe” (1991 22). Thanks especially 
to the emphasis on “us” this sounds like a reductive definition of 
objectivity in terms of socially relative approval. And Rorty also 
said more than once that “‘Truth’ is not the name of a power which 
eventually wins through, it is just the nominalization of an appro-
batory adjective” (1998 53 & 226). “True” expresses approval, “truth” 
is just an artifact of language that names nothing. Moreover, in his 
notorious 1979 presidential address to the American Philosophical 
Association, Rorty claimed that
[Pragmatism] is the doctrine that there are no constraints on inquiry 
save conversational ones –no wholesale constraints derived from the 
nature of the objects, or of the mind, or of language, but only those 
retail constraints provided by the remarks of our fellow-inquirers. 
(1982 165)
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So, apparently, not only is there no thing called “truth” beyond 
what we let others get away with saying; there is no world of things 
at all to constrain what we say. 
A critic like Putnam thinks that what human beings do and 
other animals don’t, or don’t do nearly do as well as we, is think; and 
thinking is the pursuit of objective truth, or truth about the way ob-
jects or things really are in the world. Putnam says that we should 
[R]ecognize that one of our fundamental self-conceptualizations, one 
of our fundamental ‘self-descriptions’, in Rorty’s phrase, is that we 
are thinkers, and that as thinkers we are committed to there being 
some kind of truth, some kind of correctness which is substantial and 
not merely ‘disquotational’. That means that there is no eliminating 
the normative. (1985 246)
The other animals can never say or believe anything true. They 
are evidently mere parts of the natural, causal order of things, and 
they can only bleat whatever bleats the world forces out of them. 
We human beings, however, have something driving our speak-
ing, writing, and believing that is irreducible to physical forces and 
bodily emotions. We have reason, which, as shown tu us by the true 
or ideally acceptable things to say, takes us beyond causation –or at 
least it does if we choose to be rational. As Kant pointed out, we 
human beings can also choose to reject our rationality and thus 
become like the other animals. To use an example Putnam recurs 
to, that’s what the Nazis did (1990 23-24). They embraced the myths, 
lies, and propaganda that satisfied them and got them what they 
wanted; and as they did so they exulted in depravity, dehumanizing 
others and leaving their own humanity behind. Thus, for Putnam, 
Rorty’s attitude toward truth and objectivity involved flirting with 
the worst kind of evil and mental sickness. No wonder Putnam’s 
tone in his criticisms of Rorty sometimes seemed one of barely sup-
pressed contempt.
II
Readers like Putnam make Rorty deny the existence of truth and 
the objective world; but it takes only a little reflection to see a big 
difference between “[t]here is no truth or world beyond what we 
say” and “[n]o truth or world beyond what we say puts constraints 
on our speaking and writing”. The latter claim is compatible with 
utter indifference to the question whether there is a truth or a real 
world “out there” beyond our theories and thoughts. And Rorty could 
hardly have expressed any more explicitly his indifference to any such 
transcendent entities. He compared pragmatists to secularists who 
have no interest in proving the non-existence of God but still want 
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to stop talking about Him, in political and moral contexts especially, 
because they think it isn’t helping anything (cf. Rorty 1982 xiv). Rorty 
did not really try to prove the non-existence of objective, external 
truth, a “wholesale” abstract ideal out beyond all our particular 
“retail” real-life verifications, a thing that is somehow calling us 
to verbal and intellectual righteousness. Instead, he argued that 
there was nothing to be gained philosophically by holding on to the 
idea of such a thing. His light-hearted “reduction” of objectivity to 
solidarity was offered explicitly as a rejection of metaphysics and 
epistemology, not as an account of what objective truth really is or 
whether it really exists. Instead of showing us what there is or is 
not, Rorty was much more interested in having us reconsider what 
matters. He was debating importance, not existence. 
Of course, someone might think that importance depends on 
existence, and indeed much of Western philosophy since Plato 
seems to take this dependence for granted. The real or the per-
manent, which is the same from perceiver to perceiver, culture to 
culture, and day to day, is the source of real value. Fleeting particu-
lar “appearances”, including our local and transitory desires for the 
perishable things of the perceivable world, distract us from these 
abstract objects and tie us to our particular bodies. If we don’t want 
to be reincarnated as birds or donkeys –or, less metaphorically, if we 
want to hang on to and display the feature that elevates us above the 
other animals– we had better pay as little attention as possible to the 
manifold of appearances and as much as possible to the impercepti-
ble abstract things, or maybe the Parmenidean, unitary Thing, that 
our reason lets us see (cf. Phaedo 80c-84b). The seventeenth century 
complicated this story by showing how the abstractions knowable 
by reason might include items made of quantities like force, mass, 
motion, extension in space, and the like. That is, they might include 
the “material” things Plato would have considered transitory and 
not nearly as well worth thinking about as the form of the good. But 
modern rationalism remained rationalism, and it still argued that 
our reason, rather than our perceptions and emotions, was our only 
source of thoughts about real things.
Rorty understands the pragmatist to compete with the empiri-
cist or positivist for the position of radical anti-rationalist (cf. Rorty 
1982 xvii). William James also described this competition when he 
said that while pragmatism represented the “empiricist temper reg-
nant”, it also challenged both the “tough-minded” empiricist and 
“tender-minded” rationalist schools of thought (cf. James 1975 12f). 
Both empiricism and pragmatism try to return our attention from 
the abstractly universal to particularities and localities, especially 
the particular experiences and desires we have in the course of living 
our contingent, grubby, dangerous, and imperfect day-to-day lives. 
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The story of reason as a power exalted above those contingencies 
has had its uses in our journey from barbarism to half-civilization, 
and a more experience-based and practical understanding of ratio-
nality can still be helpful today; but we evidently cannot and do not 
leave our irrational perceptions or emotions behind when we think 
and speak meaningfully, whatever our subject matter.
Pragmatists and traditional empiricists agree that the rational-
ists’ story of pure abstractions known to reason alone is a lot of 
nonsense, but they mean different things by that claim. Empiricists 
mean that since talk about purely abstract forms and principles is 
unconnected with sensation, it is so much sophistry and illusion, 
suitable for consignment to the flames. Pragmatists mean that we 
typically find no satisfactory use for such talk in our lives of practi-
cal experience, or at least that other ways of talking have proven 
to be much more helpful. Empiricists argue that only perceivable 
and measurable things are knowable, and then they use the epis-
temological cart to drag the metaphysical horse, taking their point 
about meaninglessness to entail that no suprasensible things exist.3 
But pragmatism allows meaningful talk of abstract objects, general 
principles, material substance, minds, angels, or any other non-
perceivable things, as long as that talk tells us to expect some kind 
of good or bad practical consequences in our life of experience.4 As 
far as Rorty, Dewey, or William James are concerned, whatever our 
subject matter may be, we are not only making sense but speaking 
truth as long as what we say helps us live in a satisfactory way. 
Thus Putnam was in a way right but in a more important way 
wrong about the challenge to reason offered by Rorty. Rorty was 
indeed attacking the rationalist idea that as human beings we have 
to rise above contingent causes and search for ideal truth about 
the objects. He attacked this idea as rationalists have used it in the 
history of philosophy, and he also wanted to confront contempo-
rary philosophical attempts to edit out of the human story the way 
we get our “truths” from our practical lives of experimentation, 
3 My favorite examples of this empiricist maneuver are the fusillade of arguments of-
fered by Philonous in Berkeley’s Three Dialogues to the effect that since the idea of 
matter involves both being perceivable and being external to the mind, that idea is 
“inconsistent” or “repugnant” to conception, and nothing repugnant to conception 
can exist in nature –or, at least, no such thing can be believed in by us. See Berkeley 
(1979), in the first and third dialogues especially. 
4 James’s whole goal in promoting pragmatism was making his increasingly Darwinian 
nineteenth-century world safe not only for scientists but also for religious and moral 
thinkers (cf. James chap. 1). And even Quine the neo-pragmatist (which is not the same 
thing as a “new pragmatist”) argued in his famous “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” that 
“in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in 
degree and not in kind” (Quine 44).
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conversation, joy, and misery in sundry localized circumstances. 
But Putnam was wrong to accuse Rorty of positivistically “reducing” 
thinking or language to noises produced and observed regularly in 
the causal order. In fact Rorty made it clear that, following both 
Putnam and Quine, he had serious doubts about the very idea of 
reductive definitions.5 Instead his naturalism was best understood 
as an inclination to describe thought in causal terms. It was not a 
reductive theory of truth but a non-theory, or less a theory than a 
story. It treated the history of truth as a lot of contingent histori-
cal processes rather than an unchanging real essence waiting, or 
demanding, to be spoken and defined. And, more important, those 
historical processes were the particular life processes of real, live 
truth-seekers. The “conversation” was something that happened, 
and continued to happen, in our natural, observable world.
III
We use the adjective “true”, according to Rorty, when we ap-
prove of the consequences of this or that belief or claim. We do not 
ascertain how things are with the truth or in the world and only 
then decide what it would be best to say. Those are observable facts 
about our “approbatory” use of “true” –but of course those are not 
the only facts. We also do not put beliefs aside to lie unmolested af-
ter we pronounce them true. We put them to work and then evaluate 
them again, we share the ideas that seem good with others, we meet 
people with different ideas and compare ours with theirs, we decide 
which beliefs to call true, and then we start the whole process over 
again. As often as not, we later find ourselves criticizing our origi-
nal evaluations and adopting new theories and thoughts. Thanks to 
this kind of ongoing, back-and-forth conversation among ourselves 
and with outsiders, we learn that we have a perennial need to be 
ready and willing to revise our current beliefs. 
Well, actually, not everyone has learned this. We talk some-
times of “freshman relativism”, that bird’s nest of ideas featuring 
most prominently the confident belief that what is true for you is 
not necessarily true for me. This view, if we want to call it that, 
is mainly motivated by insecurity. Young persons who don’t know 
anything about the world want to insure that no one can tell them 
anything, and so they perform the philosophical equivalent of 
sticking their fingers in their ears and saying la-la-la-la until that 
annoying would-be educator goes away. But people who know a 
5 Rorty agrees with the “non-reductive physicalism” of Putnam and Donald Davidson, 
and argues that reduction of any kind, especially the philosophically useful kind, is 
rare because “it is very rare the case that we can […] show that a given language-game 
which has been played for some time is, in fact, dispensable” (1991 115).
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few things about the world know the value of at least hearing other 
people out, comparing others’ experiences with their own, and only 
then deciding whether to hold on to old beliefs or adopt new ones. 
In the truth-seeking process, this bit of worldly wisdom is institu-
tionalized in standard warnings we issue involving the word “true”. 
Nevertheless, if Rorty is right, we do not commit ourselves to the ex-
istence of a substantive, objective truth by those standard warnings. 
Rorty acknowledged our “cautionary use of ‘true’”, or our oc-
casional recognition that a theory or belief is as justified as it could 
be under the circumstances but still might not be true or good to 
believe (cf. 1991 128;1998 60f). Everybody knows we do talk this way 
sometimes, and nobody, least of all Rorty, denies over the years 
that this has also proven to be a good thing. Rorty’s “ethnocentric” 
understanding of truth, in terms of what we real inquirers actu-
ally find it helpful to believe, may seem to be at odds with the idea 
that we inquirers sometimes have to correct ourselves or get cor-
rection from others, and it may even seem to be a backhanded way 
–a rather blockheaded, freshman-relativist way– of achieving the 
“certainty” that Platonistic rationalists told us to seek and that 
figures like Dewey wanted to help us live without.6 But Rorty was 
trying instead to focus attention on real situations of inquiry and 
leave behind idealities known only to reason. Rorty’s ethnocentrism 
was his anti-Platonism. 
The post-Philosophical culture that Rorty hoped to help bring 
along, centered on cultural politics rather than rational proofs, will 
still look to others and to the future for tests of even its most satis-
factory “truths”.7 Inquirers will be aware that satisfaction has a way 
of turning out to be only partial. They will know that future disap-
pointments have a habit of lurking in the darkness ahead, and they 
will know all about the way previously unheard-from members of 
our culture or “us” tend to pop up announcing their grievances 
and dissents. They will also realize that they have yet to determine 
the extent of “us”, and so they will be braced for the discovery or 
the admission to the party of new conversational partners with 
challenging things to say. However, they can acknowledge all this 
without appealing to any objective, persisting, ideal truth that must 
be there behind the fleeting appearances or the actual results of our 
belief-creating investigations. All they have to recognize is that the 
process of deciding what to say is not yet over and may in fact go on 
as long as speakers like us experience life.
In fact, apart from particular cases in which hypotheses get in-
vestigated, believed, and then questioned some more, there is no ideal 
6 Dewey (1929) is the classic pragmatic statement in criticism of this pursuit.
7 At Rorty we find pragmatism depicted as the “political” conception of what has been 
sought and what there is to be gained by doing philosophy (cf. 1991b 9-26; 2007).
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truth any more than there is, in William James’s example, abstract 
health or wealth apart from the particular persons and acts associ-
ated with those abstractions (cf. James 106). Which is to say, while 
there might be some kind of “health” and “truth” up there with the 
gods in Plato’s heaven, they are not what we call every day by those 
names, so who cares? We might even think of the word “health” 
not as a name at all but rather as the nominalization or reification 
of an approbatory adjective, “healthy”. Maybe the actual historical 
etymology didn’t go that way, but the point is that we do not neces-
sarily intend to speak of health as a thing when we say that an act or 
a person is healthy. Particular healthy persons, who make their own 
abilities to perform definite activities of respiration, reproduction, 
good digestion, and heavy lifting, constitute the only health that we 
ever really take any interest in; and likewise the beliefs we generate, 
verify, criticize, and revise over our different lives of activity consti-
tute the only truth that we ever actually care about. Rorty’s idea that 
a cautionary use of “true” complements the usual approbatory use fits 
this pragmatic picture—which is pretty much the antithesis of fresh-
man relativism or any other kind of upside-down quest for certainty.
IV
Of course, we want beliefs that not only seem true but really are 
true, just as we want not only to feel well but that really be well; but 
this does not mean that we want to get in touch with abstract ob-
jects called truth and health that exist apart from all the misleading 
concrete appearances. The health and the truth we want are both 
practical abilities to achieve certain satisfactions, not things that 
are as they are no matter what we perceive, how we feel, or what we 
can do. Even what we call “real” health is a matter of continuing 
to feel well, continuing to meet the criteria for being called well. 
Likewise, what we recognize as “real” truth is a matter of continu-
ing to seem true. It is belief that continues to pay off in life. And so 
Rorty wanted to help us see that if we want to find truth, we had 
better do what in fact we usually do to find it, which is pay attention 
to the satisfactions and frustrations we experience in practical life. 
For me, this seems to put Rorty squarely into the historical 
pragmatic tradition. Even Peirce, despite his theory of truth as an 
ideal set of beliefs distinct from the beliefs we affirm on subjective 
grounds, pointed out in “The Fixation of Belief” that:
We may fancy that [a settlement of opinion or belief] is not enough 
for us, and that we seek, not merely an opinion, but a true opinion. 
But put this fancy to the test and it proves groundless; for as soon as 
a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be 
true or false. (1931 5 375)
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Peirce later reconsidered some things about this remark, but 
he did not give up the idea that “‘a settlement of Belief,’ or, in other 
words, a state of satisfaction, is all that truth, or the aim of inqui-
ry, consists in” (6 485). Rorty argued this same point in different 
terms.
Peirce had other things to say about truth besides this, of course, 
and he was famously critical of James for understanding truth in 
terms of current satisfactions rather than in terms of dispositional-
ity or “habit” (cf. 6:485). Truth was not what did happen to satisfy 
us; instead, it was what would satisfy us after an indefinite amount 
of inquiry. But James, in fact, far from denying this, insisted on it. 
He said that “[a]ll such qualities [as health and wealth] sink to the 
status of ‘habits’ between their times of exercise; and similarly truth 
becomes a habit of certain of our ideas and beliefs in their intervals 
of rest from their verifying activities” (106).
Truth is not just the present reality of beliefs providing satisfac-
tions, but isn’t either a pure, pre-existing ideality. For Peirce and 
James alike, truth is the disposition to provide satisfactions, a habit 
or function we inquirers create as we create the opinions, theories, 
hypotheses, or beliefs that have that habit. And though truth cannot 
simply be identified with the beliefs we generate or the satisfactions 
we get from those beliefs, the truth we care about has no abstract 
existence apart from those particularities, either. 
James did occasionally say things that could be taken for simple 
identifications of truth with actual satisfaction –as did Peirce, as we 
just saw. But when we look at their remarks in context, it is clear 
that both James and Peirce thought of truth neither positivistically 
or rationalistically, neither as a simple collection of observable, con-
crete, real beliefs nor as a pure abstract ideal. Instead they saw it as a 
goal made out of realities, a “habit” or normal, typical function that 
we not only seek but also make out of the real; particular beliefs we 
develop as tools for coping. Not all our beliefs are true, but there is 
no truth that we know of or care about apart from our real beliefs 
and what they contingently do. 
Rorty’s “conversation” is the same process of practical satis-
faction-seeking that both James and Peirce identified as the origin 
of truth. It is the accumulation of particular beliefs that satisfy us, 
whoever “we” are. At first, this sounds like a story a positivist could 
love but, remember, “us” is not a pre-specified group. “Our culture” 
shrinks and grows over time, and it might even end up encompass-
ing all of humanity –though that’s unlikely, since humanity seems 
to include both the severely mentally challenged and the Nazis. 
Rorty said that “‘[u]s’ here does not mean ‘us humans’ (for Nazis 
are humans too). It means something like ‘us tolerant wet liberals’” 
(1998 53). Obviously the categorization “wet liberal” is not just out 
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there now, holding all the thinkers it will ever hold. “We” can and will 
try to make others as wet as we are. Sometimes, rarely, we will even 
convert the occasional young Nazi. Rorty’s “us” is “an ethnos which 
prides itself on its suspicion of ethnocentrism –on its ability to in-
crease the freedom and openness of encounters” (Rorty 1991 2).
Moreover, Rorty obviously either got a little confused or was 
speaking colloquially about his own view in the preceding pas-
sage. “Us” is, of course, an “indexical” term like “today” or “me”. Its 
meaning stays the same while its reference varies over occasions of 
utterance, and thus its meaning will not specify any particular group 
with any given set of characteristics. “Us” will refer, depending on 
who’s talking, to different shrinking and growing, appearing and 
disappearing groups, not only to us Western middle-of-the-roaders. 
In “good for us to believe”, therefore, it will have to mean something 
more like “us believers or conversationalists in our culture, whatever 
that culture may be”. That still will not necessarily include all human-
ity or all rational beings –but it might do just that, in the end, and we 
are free to try to coax any and all thinkers into joining “us”. 
For both Rorty and the paleopragmatists, then, the truth, the 
thing that is good for us conversationalists to believe, will result 
from a process of development with an open future. When and if it 
arrives, truth will have a history, the history of particular believers 
and their local efforts, in unpredictable, contingent, and chang-
ing circumstances, to create both satisfactory beliefs and cultural 
groups to be satisfied by those beliefs. Though the language used to 
make this point by the pragmatists sometimes suggests it, truth is 
not, for either Peirce, James, or Rorty, simply whatever happens at 
the moment to satisfy any specifiable group of thinkers.
V
Again, this kind of helpful naturalistic description of what goes 
on when we use language truly is what the historical pragmatism 
was all about. William James took pains to explain that he was doing 
just this, especially in his responses to his remarkably uncompre-
hending critic Bertrand Russell. Russell understood James to offer a 
logical definition of truth and, moreover, one that was easily refuted 
by counterexamples; James responded that he was not “defining” 
truth in Russell’s sense. There is no denying that James often did 
say things that sounded like traditional definitions of truth; the 
claim in Pragmatism that “‘The true,’ to put it very briefly, is only 
the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as ‘the right’ is only the 
expedient in the way of our behaving” (James 106, italics in original), 
looks very much like a definition of truth in terms of expediency 
or “working”. But James says that the real “essence” of truth, what 
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should be given in a “definition” or a “theory” like this, is the “causa 
existendi” of our truth-attributions or our beliefs, or the why rather 
than the what of truth (cf. 313). James used the language of defini-
tions to tell us where the stuff we know as truth contingently comes 
from and why it comes into being.8 Knowing that will actually help us 
recognize truth and get more of it. The logically necessary definition 
of truth will not do that job.
Russell argued in response to James’s definition of truth that if it 
were correct, “[i]t is expedient to believe that other people exist, but 
they don’t” and “it is true that other people exist, but they don’t” would 
be equally sensible things to say. The first claim makes sense, though 
only a solipsist would believe it; the second claim is ruled out by logic 
as a kind of self-contradiction. James’s startling response to this was:
The social proposition ‘other men exist’ [that is, “it is true that other 
men exist”] and the pragmatist proposition ‘it is expedient to believe 
that other men exist’ come from different universes of discourse. One 
can believe the second without being logically compelled to believe 
the first; one can believe the first without ever having heard of the 
second; or one can believe them both. The first expresses the object of 
a belief, the second tells of one condition of the belief ’s power to main-
tain itself . [James 279f, emphasis added]. 
That is, James does not offer his pragmatic definition as a syn-
onym for “true” or an account of what that term entails logically. 
Instead he is offering an explanation of the real-life process by 
which we decide what beliefs we will identify as “true”. For James, 
going from talk about truth a another about expediency involves 
switching “universes of discourse”, or changing the subject from 
the world as it happens to be known to the believer to the world as 
it happens to be known to us investigators of truth. 
Russell was interested in truth as a Platonic ideality, not an ev-
eryday practical reality. He therefore responded to James that even 
if we did happen to apply the term “true” to useful beliefs, it was still 
a big mistake to confuse the search for truth with our actual belief-
choice processes. It would be like confusing the books in a library 
with the card catalogue (Russell 120f). Just as the whole point of 
the catalogue is to let us know about something else that exists and 
is there, the whole point of our truth-picking processes is to let us 
know about an ideal something, truth, that is there waiting beyond 
those often misleading processes and the beliefs they produce. That 
thing will in turn put us in touch with whatever other things there 
are in the world, and this connection to realities or reality is what 
makes truth valuable. James’s verificationism threatens to make us 
overlook the whole point of our efforts to verify our beliefs. 
8 This is the central piece of evidence for my argument in Cormier (2000).
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But the real point of our actual inquiries, what really satisfies 
us and what keeps us investigating, is exactly what James tried to 
explain in a naturalistic way. Jamesian pragmatists are like anthro-
pologists watching from the blinds the natives of a sophisticated, 
successful society. As the philosophical observers watch the natives 
and their relations to the objects in the world, they see expediency; 
but the natives typically see only objects or signs of objects, about 
which they are motivated to develop beliefs. The observers note that 
the beliefs the natives call “true” are not always those that corre-
spond to real objects; “true” beliefs are instead those that happen 
to work in a certain way for the believers, the ones that “maintain 
themselves” for a while in the natives’ world-view by making life 
easier in one way or another. The expedient, helpful beliefs they 
develop are not mere cards in the card catalogue; the natives get 
what they want, when they do in fact manage to get what they want, 
out of those beliefs, not out of something else to which the beliefs 
are a mere guide or of which they are a mere representation. The 
pragmatic philosophical observers of all this activity then conclude 
that the best and most reliable way to understand native attribu-
tions of truth is in terms of expediency –though of course this does 
not mean that the believers do or should see themselves and their 
beliefs in this way. 
It also does not mean that the natives never see themselves in 
this way, or that they shouldn’t, or that they do or should have any 
consistent view of these philosophical matters at all. As it happens, 
the pragmatic observers have picked up this way of understanding 
inquiry from the “geologists, biologists and philologists” among the 
natives that they have been observing (cf. James 34). But not all the 
natives see things this way, nor is there any particular need for all of 
them to do so. James offers this typically colorful analogy:
A horse may be defined as a beast that walks on the nails of his middle 
digits. Whenever we see a horse we see such a beast, just as whenever 
we believe a ‘truth’ we believe something expedient. Messrs. Russell 
and Hawtrey, if they followed their anti-pragmatist logic, would have 
to say here that we see that it is such a beast, a fact hardly visible if you 
are not a comparative anatomist. (318)
Likewise, it takes a pragmatic philosophical thinker to see ex-
pediency where philosophically uninterested native believers see 
objects and truth, but expediency is there nevertheless. 
James does not deny that the logical concept of truth involves a 
relationship to objects. In fact, in his response to Russell, he casually 
treats claims about objects and claims about truth as interchangeable. 
He evidently regards “other men exist” as just another way of say-
ing “it is true that other men exist”; and surely this is the expectable 
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pragmatist view, since the practical consequences of the beliefs rep-
resented by these claims would seem to be just the same. But James 
also shows us that we don’t really need, or in fact use, correspon-
dence to objects in the way we may think we do. When we ascend 
to the pragmatist’s perspective and switch “universes of discourse”, 
we observe that beliefs survive in the hunt for truth thanks to their 
usefulness, not their correspondence. The only agreement with re-
ality that James recognizes as typically important to the pursuit of 
truth is “agreeable leading”, the ability of beliefs or claims to lead us 
to good results in our life of trying to do things (cf. James 97). No 
other kind of agreement with or correspondence to objects, even to 
“objects” made out of sensations, plays any significant role in the 
true story of truth.
Correspondence and objects may exist, and we pragmatic ob-
servers can even appeal to objects as we explain what the natives 
are doing. We can point out that sometimes native beliefs match the 
objects and sometimes they don’t, and we can use this observation 
to explain why correspondence does not really matter to the natives’ 
ways of figuring out what to say. But in the end we observers will 
have to recognize that we are “natives”, too, and that our own ways 
of ascertaining when native speech is corresponding and when it is 
missing the mark –which include all of our own ways of ascertain-
ing what is true and what’s really “out there”– are subject to the 
same kind of condescension on the part of whatever observers may 
be watching us. Nobody’s beliefs get any discoverable constraint 
from objects that transcend the believers’ conversational efforts 
to decide what beliefs it would be best to accept and announce. 
Perhaps this realization will send a skeptical chill down our spines; 
but maybe not, especially if we also realize that even without wor-
rying about correspondence to objects our society can continue to 
be as successful, and as self-critical, as ever. When we are directed 
to face reality or be objective, we can respond the way we have always 
responded without noticing it before; that is, we can try to insure that 
we are thinking and saying the best things we can think and say.
We can also share our insights into these matters with the na-
tives we have been studying. We will not have to do it as if we were 
handing knowledge down from Olympus, and we’ll be especially 
disinclined to display any kind of intellectual imperialism once we 
realize our own status as natives. But we may want to offer our pic-
ture of expedient truth as something that happens to be expedient 
to believe in its own right. We may have noticed that some native 
believers have reached states of deadlock with others, arguing im-
placably that the man did go around both the squirrel and the tree, 
that a fetus is a human being, or that God did not intelligently design 
the universe, all the while indicating no practical consequences of 
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those beliefs that might be used as a test. We can offer pragmatism 
as a way out of deadlock in such cases. Usefulness can answer ques-
tions that sensation or reason alone cannot, and sometimes the lack 
of a genuinely useful answer on either side of a question can show 
us that there is no real issue at stake. 
The appeal to practical worthwhileness is not an instant pana-
cea; there may be long hunts for compelling evidence ahead, and 
in fact pragmatism gives no guarantee that there will be a single, 
universally convincing resolution of every intellectual dispute. But 
pragmatism, in James’s phrase, “unstiffens our theories” by help-
ing us see that evidence is relevant to everything properly called a 
belief. It can help us unblock the road of inquiry by showing us that 
in a world of changing evidence we may have to change even our fa-
vorite beliefs every so often. It makes human beings that much less 
dogmatic and that much more willing to listen to one another and 
to consider new ideas. And for this reason we pragmatic observers 
may be inclined to share our beneficial discoveries with our native 
subjects, and we may want to hold on to pragmatism as our own 
undogmatic and revisable philosophical position. 
VI
The “new pragmatists” are typically careful to acknowledge 
the valuable features of traditional pragmatism, especially its falli-
bilism, its lack of reliance on foundational certainties, and its status 
as a naturalistic non-definition of truth. But they insist that all of 
these good things are compatible with a search for the objective, 
and they fault Rorty for not recognizing this. They want, as Jeffrey 
Stout and Mark Johnston would put it, “pragmatism without nar-
cissism”, or a view that affirms the importance of things outside 
ourselves and our search for our own satisfactions (cf. Misak 8f).
Stout illustrates the problem with Rorty’s lack of commitment 
to objectivity with an interesting example. 
Consider an Olympian athlete who takes pride in her excellence as an 
archer. Aiming to hit the bull’s-eye and […] live up to her discipline’s 
standard of athletic excellence lead her to do exactly the same things: to 
release the tension from her body, focus her attention, adopt the appro-
priate stance, draw her bow in a certain way, and so on. But why would 
it follow that it makes no sense to say that hitting the target is one of her 
goals? […].Unfortunately, a gust of wind blows her arrow to the left of 
the bull’s-eye. Will she not be disappointed? […]. It seems that it does 
make sense, then, to speak of my having two distinct goals even if I do 
exactly the same things in trying to accomplish them. (Misak 20)
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We fail to capture the target-directedness of archery if we fail 
to appreciate the role played in the practice by hitting the target. 
Analogously, when I seek the truth, though I strive to attain belief 
that is justified or that seems satisfactory to my cultural peers, it 
still makes sense to say that getting the objective truth is one of my 
goals. Local satisfaction and objective truth are two distinct goals 
even if we do all and only the same observable things in pursuing 
either of them. We fail to capture the truth-directedness of inquiry 
if we fail to appreciate the role played in the practice by getting the 
objective truth. The Rortian ethnocentrist is therefore mistaken to 
identify the pursuit of truth with the development of beliefs that 
“we” currently like or can justify to ourselves. 
We don’t have to be ethnocentrists to be anti-Platonists, in 
Stout’s picture; objective truth need not be a purely Platonic ideal 
or goal even if it transcends local justifications and agreement. Our 
developing social practices may have been essential to the creation 
of that ideal. Maybe we created the search for truth just as we cre-
ated archery, by creating norms of acceptable behavior in an activity. 
However, in both cases we seem to have created activities that involve 
looking outside ourselves in pursuit of goals. 
Stout’s analogy is misconceived, however. It is not about objec-
tive truth being to inquiry as targets are to archery. This happens 
because we can test to find out whether archers are shooting at tar-
gets, but no test will tell us whether inquirers are trying to get at 
objective truth. Archery without aiming at targets would indeed 
look very different to observers standing from the anthropologists’ 
blind; our archer would keep loosening up, drawing the bow, and 
letting arrows fly in just the same way even after the wind changed, 
after other archers hit more bull’s-eyes with different techniques, 
and after we experimental observers contrived to have her targets 
moved. But inquiry would look pretty much the same with or with-
out the search for objective truth. Our inquirers will not readjust 
their experimental strategies if they don’t get objective truth or if 
other inquirers are getting more objective truth using other tech-
niques –as long as they keep getting beliefs that satisfy them or 
that seem true by their standards. Moreover, by contrast, if the 
outcomes of inquiry stop meeting inquirers’ criteria for good, 
justifiable, or satisfactory beliefs, or if our inquirers spot other in-
quirers getting more satisfaction from different beliefs, then our 
inquirers will start seeking replacements –for their beliefs, their 
criteria of justification, or both.9 
9 James emphasized, to Peirce’s dismay, what amounted to the idea that pragmatism 
could not only tell us what to believe, or how to be scientific, but could also tell us how 
to decide what to believe, or whether to be a scientist at all. See his remarks on pragma-
tism as a “corridor” among moral, scientific, and religious outlooks (cf. James 32).
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This is obviously not to say that inquirers do or should arbi-
trarily pick their beliefs. They look for evidence, especially evidence 
relevant to actions that will make life better –and this way of pro-
ceeding has in fact made their lives better in many ways. They 
proceed pragmatically, though they do not necessarily think of 
themselves as doing so. In fact, they often praise objectivity and 
deplore ethnocentric traits like bias, prejudice, and partiality on the 
part of investigators, at least in some areas of investigation. Still, 
they sometimes also say commonsense things like “You can’t really 
be objective. All you can do is express your point of view and let 
your claims compete in the marketplace of ideas”. Sometimes they 
exalt experts who “know what they’re talking about”, and some-
times they praise “idealists” and “persons of faith”. Sometimes they 
dogmatize like infallible popes, sometimes they display “healthy 
skepticism”. Sometimes they pound the table and insist that their 
opponents face reality, sometimes they are freshman relativists and 
want only to be left alone. They are fans of Plato, Kant, Descartes, 
Marx, Emerson, Nietzsche, Rorty, and Derrida, and they think that 
all of that philosophy stuff is so much meshugas. They see them-
selves differently on different days, and on no day do they all see 
themselves the same way. This means that there is no way to use the 
inquirers’ own professed self-understanding as evidence that they 
either are or are not seeking transcendent objectivity. 
VII
Shall we philosophical observers teach inquirers the truth about 
truth, and shall we demand consistency? I don’t think we’ll get very 
far if we try. It seems to me that the best we can do is take a hard, 
close look at how we think about things, encourage those who are 
taking the conversation in good directions, and challenge think-
ers who cannot quite choke down all the wacky new ideas that the 
nineteenth century has brought us. And I think that this is what 
Rorty did. He did not offer his ethnocentrism as a way of ruling 
out anybody’s ways of talking; he was happy to let us continue talk-
ing about objectivity as long as that talk brought good results, and 
obviously it has done a lot of good in contexts like law and physi-
cal science. But sometimes it has blocked the road of inquiry, and 
it may have done so especially in philosophy itself. Therefore Rorty 
urged the philosophical observers of inquiry to take a closer look at 
how we actually succeed in our investigations and to give objectivity 
a rest for a while.
This micro-reform may make the world a better place, and it 
may not. If it does, the improvements may be small; some philosophy 
professors may become less self-certain and self-righteous. Or those 
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improvements may reshape human life; some solitary prophetic 
thinker may get a dollop of encouragement she would not other-
wise have had, and she may consequently develop and persist in 
promoting the next great theory, novel, film, political movement, 
Web-based application, or renewable energy resource. Rorty him-
self seemed to want most of all to provide intellectual support for 
“us” Westerners and our tolerant wet liberal politics, or our experi-
mental and (slowly, steadily) progressive way of life (cf. Rorty 1999). 
He wanted to help us see how we can and why we should defend 
our politics from the theorists and the thugs of both the far left and 
the far right. Even –maybe especially– without doing metaphysics, 
we can see that both left-wing extremes of internationalism and 
right-wing extremes of social-Darwinist individualism depend 
on endlessly debatable theories of what human beings are like and 
their proper place in the Real World. If we can shake free of those 
theories and just have a look at what actually makes life better, we 
can justify (to ourselves, at least) our bland, un-Romantic social ef-
forts to provide citizens with access to clean water, unadulterated 
food, fulfilling jobs, housing, health care, free speech and thought, 
political representation, and the rest of the intellectually unexciting 
things that have proven to make human life decent and dignified. 
Of course, even a struggle for these acknowledged goods is not 
certain to yield happy outcomes. Pragmatic philosophers, like the 
rest of the inquirers, have to wait for the future to see what works 
out for the best. But Rorty praised thinkers who set out to free their 
own and others’ minds, to develop ideas that benefit their friends 
and their society, and to make that society as inclusive and happy as 
possible. If all we can do is bet on contingent beneficial outcomes, 
this at least seems like a bet on the right horses. 
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